A very long story and still can't understand, just mark down.
//Introduction
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/8068317/how-to-develop-iphone-mdm-server
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/10293363/how-to-set-mdm-payloads-identity-in-ipcu
=================
Creating a Profile Server for Over-The-Air Enrollment and Configuration
When creating a profile server, you must perform several steps:
-
Configure your infrastructure. This is described in Configuring the Infrastructure.
-
Obtain an SSL Certificate for your server. This is described in Obtaining an SSL Certificate.
-
Create a template configuration profile. This is described in Creating A Template Configuration Profile.
-
Create the server code. The pieces of a server are described in Starting the Server and Profile Service Handlers.
-
Add appropriate authentication specific to your environment.
-
Test the service.
The sections that follow take you through the various parts of the profile delivery service source code.
Configuring the Infrastructure
Implementing over-the-air enrollment and configuration requires you to integrate authentication, directory, and certificate services. The process can be deployed using standard web services, but you must set up several key systems ahead of time.
Directory Services
For user authentication, you can use basic HTTP authentication or integrate authentication with your existing directory services. Regardless of the services used, you will need to provide a web-based authentication method for your users to request enrollment.
Certificate Services
The process of enrollment requires deployment of standard x.509 identity certificates to iOS users. To do this, you will need a CA (certificate authority) to issue the device credentials using the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).
Cisco IOS and Microsoft Server 2003 (with the add-on for certificate services) both support SCEP. There are also a number of hosted PKI services that support SCEP, such as Verisign, Entrust, and RSA. For links to PKI, SCEP, and related topics read the See Also section in Introduction.
Profile Services
To implement this process you will need to develop a profile service, which is an HTTP-based daemon that manages iOS-based device connections throughout the process, generates configuration profiles for the user, and verifies user credentials along the way.
There are a few key functions that the profile service needs to provide:
-
Host a user-accessible website to support the HTTPS session
-
Authenticate incoming user requests using a web-based authentication method (basic, or integrated with directory services)
-
Generate the necessary configuration profiles (XML format) depending on the phase of the process
-
Sign and encrypt configuration profiles using public key cryptography
-
Track the user through the steps in the process (via timestamp and logging methods)
-
Manage connections to the certificate authority or directory services
Obtaining an SSL Certificate
The first step in setting up a profile service is to obtain or generate an SSL certificate for the web server. When hosting a profile server, each iOS-based device must be able to make a secure connection to the server. The easiest way to do this is to get an SSL certificate from a public CA that is already trusted by iOS. For a complete list, see iOS 3.0: List of Available Trusted Root Certificates.
Alternatively, you can generate your own root certificate and self-sign it, though if you do, the user will be asked whether they trust the certificate.
Creating A Template Configuration Profile
The profile service uses a template configuration profile as the starting point, then modifies the profile for a specific device. You must create this template ahead of time and save it to a file on disk. The iPhone Configuration Utility provides an easy means of creating such a base profile.
In addition to general settings, this configuration profile should also define enterprise policies that you want to enforce. For company-owned equipment, it should be a locked profile to prevent the user from removing it from the device.
For more information about these profiles, read “Configuration Profile Format” in <!--a target="_self" -->Enterprise Deployment Guide<!--/a-->.
Starting the Server
After you have an SSL certificate, you must configure a web server to host your profile service and an SCEP-aware certificate authority to issue certificates.
The initialization function, init
, loads the HTTP server’s certificate and private SSL key. These keys and certificates are stored on disk for reuse together with the serial number of the last issued certificate. This function is shown in Listing 2-1.
Listing 2-1 Starting the web server
world = WEBrick::HTTPServer.new( |
:Port => 8443, |
:DocumentRoot => Dir::pwd + "/htdocs", |
:SSLEnable => true, |
:SSLVerifyClient => OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE, |
:SSLCertificate => @@ssl_cert, |
:SSLPrivateKey => @@ssl_key |
) |
This example starts the server on port 8443
so it does not have to run as root. The :DocumentRoot
value should contain the path of an empty directory inside the profile service directory.
You should enable SSL and set the values of SSLCertificate
and SSLPrivateKey
to point to your actual SSL certificate and key that you obtained in Obtaining an SSL Certificate.
You should also disable client certificate authentication because the client device does not have a verifiable identity yet.
Profile Service Handlers
After you have a basic web server, you need to write handlers for several pages used in the enrollment and delivery process.
Phase 1: Authentication
Welcome Page (/) URL Handler
The welcome page is the first page new users see when they enter the site at the root level (/
). A handler for this page is shown in Listing 2-2.
Listing 2-2 Handler for /
URL
world.mount_proc("/") { |req, res| |
res['Content-Type'] = "text/html" |
res.body = <<WELCOME_MESSAGE |
<style> |
body { margin:40px 40px;font-family:Helvetica;} |
h1 { font-size:80px; } |
p { font-size:60px; } |
a { text-decoration:none; } |
</style> |
<h1 >ACME Inc. Profile Service</h1> |
<p>If you had to accept the certificate accessing this page, you should |
download the <a href="/CA">root certificate</a> and install it so it becomes trusted. |
<p>We are using a self-signed |
certificate here, for production it should be issued by a known CA. |
<p>After that, go ahead and <a href="/enroll">enroll</a> |
WELCOME_MESSAGE |
} |
If you used a self-signed certificate above, when the user goes to this page, Safari asks whether you want to trust the server’s SSL certificate. Agreeing allows you to view the page. This is not sufficient for enrollment, however.
Regardless of whether the site certificate is self-signed or not, the enrollment process with the SCEP service also requires the device to trust the custom certificate authority’s root certificate, which means adding the CA root certificate to the device’s trusted anchors list. To do this, you must create a URL handler that provides the certificate with the correct MIME type.
Root Certificate (/CA) URL Handler
The link to /CA
in the welcome page provides a means for the user to add the custom certificate authority’s root certificate to the device’s trusted anchors list. This is required for the SCEP stage of the enrollment process.
After Safari on iOS loads the root certificate from that URL, it asks the user for permission to add the new root certificate to the device’s trusted anchors list. (You should access this page only over a secure connection.)
The handler in Listing 2-3 sends the root certificate.
Listing 2-3 Handler for /CA
URL
world.mount_proc("/CA") { |req, res| |
res['Content-Type'] = "application/x-x509-ca-cert" |
res.body = @@root_cert.to_der |
} |
After the user has downloaded the root certificate from a trusted web server over HTTPS, the user can click to continue the enrollment process.
Enrollment (/enroll) URL Handler
Listing 2-4 provides a handler for the /enroll
link on the welcome page.
Listing 2-4 Handler for /enroll
URL
world.mount_proc("/enroll") { |req, res| |
HTTPAuth.basic_auth(req, res, "realm") {|user, password| |
user == 'apple' && password == 'apple' |
} |
res['Content-Type'] = "application/x-apple-aspen-config" |
configuration = profile_service_payload(req, "signed-auth-token") |
signed_profile = OpenSSL::PKCS7.sign(@@ssl_cert, @@ssl_key, |
configuration, [], OpenSSL::PKCS7::BINARY) |
res.body = signed_profile.to_der |
} |
The handler above performs very limited authentication to identify the user. The user logs in by sending the word apple
as the user name and password over a connection authenticated with HTTP basic authentication. In a production server environment, you should instead tie this code into a directory service or some other account system.
This handler sets the MIME type of its response to application/x-apple-aspen-config
, so Safari on iOS treats the response as a configuration profile.
The profile_service_payload
function (Profile Service Payload) produces a special configuration that tells the phone to enroll itself in the profile service. The literal string "signed-auth-token"
should be replaced with an authorization token from the authentication service that verified the user’s credentials.
Finally, this function signs the profile by calling OpenSSL::PKCS7.sign
and sends the signed profile to the device.
Security Note: This exchange occurs through HTTPS to protect the user name, password, and signed authorization token, so signing with the SSL certificate does not provide additional security. It does, however, make sense if the profile service uses a different SSL certificate and resides on a separate HTTPS server.
Profile Service Payload
The first payload sent to the device (after establishing that it is allowed to enroll) is the profile service payload. This payload is sent by a call to profile_service_payload(req, "signed-auth-token")
from the /enroll
handler (Listing 2-4).
For a sample profile service payload, see “Sample Phase 1 Server Response” in <!--a target="_self" -->Enterprise Deployment Guide<!--/a-->.
Listing 2-5 profile_service_payload
function
def profile_service_payload(request, challenge) |
payload = general_payload() |
payload['PayloadType'] = "Profile Service" # do not modify |
payload['PayloadIdentifier'] = "com.acme.mobileconfig.profile-service" |
# strings that show up in UI, customisable |
payload['PayloadDisplayName'] = "ACME Profile Service" |
payload['PayloadDescription'] = "Install this profile to enroll for secure access to ACME Inc." |
payload_content = Hash.new |
payload_content['URL'] = "https://" + service_address(request) + "/profile" |
payload_content['DeviceAttributes'] = [ |
"UDID", |
"VERSION" |
=begin |
"PRODUCT", # e.g. iPhone1,1 or iPod2,1 |
"SERIAL", # The device's serial number |
"MEID", # The device's Mobile Equipment Identifier |
"IMEI" |
=end |
]; |
if (challenge && !challenge.empty?) |
payload_content['Challenge'] = challenge |
end |
payload['PayloadContent'] = payload_content |
Plist::Emit.dump(payload) |
end |
This function starts by calling general_payload
, which sets the version and organization (these values don’t change on a given server) and returns a template payload that provides a UUID for the profile.
The payload content provides a URL where the device should send its identification (using HTTP POST), along with a list of attributes that the server expects the device to provide (software version, IMEI, and so on).
If an authorization token (representing a user authentication) is passed in from the caller (shown in Listing 2-4), that token is added as the Challenge
attribute.
In response, the device sends back the list of requested attributes along with their values. If the server sent a Challenge
value in its request, the device also includes this value along with the requested device attributes. Finally, to prove it is an iOS-based device, the device signs this identification with its device certificate. This response is sent to the handler for the /profile
URL.
WARNING: When device certificates signed “Apple iPhone Device CA” are evaluated their validity dates should be ignored.
Values Note: The payload type must not be changed; the phone expects to see the literal string "Profile Service"
.
The identifier should be changed to an appropriate reverse-DNS-style identifier. The identifier should remain constant for any given profile service.
The display name and description values are presented in the user interface to explain to the user what is about to happen.
Phase 2: Certificate Enrollment
Profile Request (/profile) URL Handler
The handler for the /profile
URL is called twice—once to send the device authentication request before the device is allowed to enroll using SCEP, then again after the SCEP step to deliver the final profile to the device.
In this handler, the profile server receives a PKCS#7 signed data payload from the device, which it then unpack and verifies. For a sample of this profile, see “Sample Phase 2 Device Response” in <!--a target="_self" -->Enterprise Deployment Guide<!--/a-->.
To make it easier to follow, the /profile
handler is divided into smaller pieces. The first piece of this handler is shown in Listing 2-6.
Listing 2-6 Handler for /profile
URL, part 1 of 7
world.mount_proc("/profile") { |req, res| |
# verify CMS blob, but don't check signer certificate |
p7sign = OpenSSL::PKCS7::PKCS7.new(req.body) |
store = OpenSSL::X509::Store.new |
p7sign.verify(nil, store, nil, OpenSSL::PKCS7::NOVERIFY) |
signers = p7sign.signers |
Security Note: The reference implementation does not verify the signer here. You should verify it against a trust store made up of intermediates from the device certificate authority up to the root CA and the hierarchy you'll use to issue profile service identities.
If the device signed the request with a certificate that belongs to the hierarchy that issues profile service identities (that is, if this device has enrolled previously), execution follows the first path (shown in Listing 2-7). This path either issues an updated encrypted configuration or, as implemented here, redirects the device to enroll again. For testing purposes, any device that has gotten a profile previously must reenroll.
Listing 2-7 Handler for /profile
URL, part 2 of 7
# this should be checking whether the signer is a cert we issued |
# |
if (signers[0].issuer.to_s == @@root_cert.subject.to_s) |
print "Request from cert with serial #{signers[0].serial}" |
" seen previously: #{@@issued_first_profile.include?(signers[0].serial.to_s)}" |
" (profiles issued to #{@@issued_first_profile.to_a}) \n" |
if (@@issued_first_profile.include?(signers[0].serial.to_s)) |
res.set_redirect(WEBrick::HTTPStatus::MovedPermanently, "/enroll") |
print res |
By this point, any previously fully enrolled clients have been redirected to the enrollment page to enroll again.
If the code gets past this step, it has received either a list of properties or a new request for a final profile.
In Listing 2-8, the encrypted profile is generated. Because this is part of phase 3 (device configuration), it is included here without further comment, and is explained further in The /profile Handler Revisited.
Listing 2-8 Handler for /profile
URL, part 3 of 7
else |
@@issued_first_profile.add(signers[0].serial.to_s) |
payload = client_cert_configuration_payload(req) |
# vpn_configuration_payload(req) |
#File.open("payload", "w") { |f| f.write payload } |
encrypted_profile = OpenSSL::PKCS7.encrypt(p7sign.certificates, |
payload, OpenSSL::Cipher::Cipher::new("des-ede3-cbc"), |
OpenSSL::PKCS7::BINARY) |
configuration = configuration_payload(req, encrypted_profile.to_der) |
end |
The code in Listing 2-9 handles the case where the device sent its identification. This part should ideally verify that the response was signed with a valid device certificate and should parse the attributes.
Listing 2-9 Handler for /profile
URL, part 4 of 7
else |
#File.open("signeddata", "w") { |f| f.write p7sign.data } |
device_attributes = Plist::parse_xml(p7sign.data) |
#print device_attributes |
The next bit of code, Listing 2-10, is commented out with =begin
and =end
. It shows how you can restrict issuance of profiles to a single device (by its unique device ID, or UDID) and verify that the Challenge
is the same as the Challenge
value issued previously.
In a production environment, this is typically replaced by site-specific code that queries a directory service to validate the authorization token and queries a database of authorized UDID values for devices owned by your organization.
Listing 2-10 Handler for /profile
URL, part 5 of 7
=begin |
# Limit issuing of profiles to one device and validate challenge |
if device_attributes['UDID'] == "213cee5cd11778bee2cd1cea624bcc0ab813d235" && |
device_attributes['CHALLENGE'] == "signed-auth-token" |
end |
=end |
Next, the snippet in Listing 2-11 obtains a payload to send to the device that will tell it how to complete the enrollment process. The details of this configuration are described in the discussion of encryption_cert_payload
.
Listing 2-11 Handler for /profile
URL, part 6 of 7
configuration = encryption_cert_payload(req, "") |
end |
Finally, if this function has nothing to send, it raises an exception that makes the http request fail. Otherwise it signs the profile to be sent and returns it. These bits of code are shown in Listing 2-12.
Listing 2-12 Handler for /profile
URL, part 7 of 7
if !configuration || configuration.empty? |
raise "you lose" |
else |
# we're either sending a configuration to enroll the profile service cert |
# or a profile specifically for this device |
res['Content-Type'] = "application/x-apple-aspen-config" |
signed_profile = OpenSSL::PKCS7.sign(@@ssl_cert, @@ssl_key, |
configuration, [], OpenSSL::PKCS7::BINARY) |
res.body = signed_profile.to_der |
File.open("profile.der", "w") { |f| f.write signed_profile.to_der } |
end |
} |
After this function sends the configuration to tell the device how to enroll, the device enrolls its identity using SCEP. Then, it sends a request for the /profile
URL associated with this handler a second time to obtain the final profile.
The actual payload is described in Configuration Profile Payload and Encryption Certificate Payload. For a sample configuration profile, see “Sample Phase 3 Server Response With SCEP Specifications” in <!--a target="_self" -->Enterprise Deployment Guide<!--/a-->.
Phase 3: Device Configuration
The /profile Handler Revisited
Previously, Listing 2-8 showed the encrypted profile generation process. The code in question doesn’t actually run until phase 3, however, so the details were deferred. This section revisits that section of the /profile
handler and provides explanation.
The encrypted profile is generated as follows:
-
A configuration is generated with a set of configuration payloads. (See “Configuration Profile Format” in <!--a target="_self" -->Enterprise Deployment Guide<!--/a--> to learn about the contents of these payloads in detail.)
In this reference implementation, every device gets the same profile. If desired, however, the
Challenge
information can be used to identify the user requesting the profile, and the code can generate a profile specific to that user.Similarly, the device information provided can be used to generate a profile specific to a given device or a particular type of device (for example, providing a different profile for different iOS-based device models).
-
The configuration is encrypted with the public key of the device that signed the original request.
-
The encrypted blob of data is wrapped in a configuration profile.
The details of this encrypted blob are explained in the descriptions of client_cert_configuration_payload
(Listing A-1) and configuration_payload
(Configuration Profile Payload).
Listing 2-13 Handler for /profile
URL, part 3 of 7 (revisited)
else |
@@issued_first_profile.add(signers[0].serial.to_s) |
payload = client_cert_configuration_payload(req) |
# vpn_configuration_payload(req) |
#File.open("payload", "w") { |f| f.write payload } |
encrypted_profile = OpenSSL::PKCS7.encrypt(p7sign.certificates, |
payload, OpenSSL::Cipher::Cipher::new("des-ede3-cbc"), |
OpenSSL::PKCS7::BINARY) |
configuration = configuration_payload(req, encrypted_profile.to_der) |
end |
Configuration Profile Payload
The configuration profile payload (provided by configuration_payload
) resembles the profile service payload described in Profile Service Payload. The only difference is in the payload its carries.
For a sample profile for this phase, see “Sample Phase 4 Device Response” in <!--a target="_self" -->Enterprise Deployment Guide<!--/a-->.
Encryption Certificate Payload
Listing 2-14 describes the encryption certificate payload. This payload tells the client how to complete the enrollment process.
Listing 2-14 encryption_cert_payload
function
def encryption_cert_payload(request, challenge) |
payload = general_payload() |
payload['PayloadIdentifier'] = "com.acme.encrypted-profile-service" |
payload['PayloadType'] = "Configuration" # do not modify |
# strings that show up in UI, customisable |
payload['PayloadDisplayName'] = "Profile Service Enroll" |
payload['PayloadDescription'] = "Enrolls identity for the encrypted profile service" |
payload['PayloadContent'] = [scep_cert_payload(request, "Profile Service", challenge)]; |
Plist::Emit.dump(payload) |
end |
The scep_cert_payload
function is described in SCEP Certificate Payload.
SCEP Certificate Payload
As the name of the scep_cert_payload
function suggests, the function shown in Listing 2-15 produces an SCEP payload that gives the device the information it needs to enroll a certificate.
Listing 2-15 scep_cert_payload
function
def scep_cert_payload(request, purpose, challenge) |
payload = general_payload() |
payload['PayloadIdentifier'] = "com.acme.encryption-cert-request" |
payload['PayloadType'] = "com.apple.security.scep" # do not modify |
The payload type of com.apple.security.scep
indicates an SCEP payload and the content specifies the parameters.
# strings that show up in UI, customisable |
payload['PayloadDisplayName'] = purpose |
payload['PayloadDescription'] = "Provides device encryption identity" |
payload_content = Hash.new |
payload_content['URL'] = "https://" + service_address(request) + "/scep" |
First and foremost, there is the base URL for the SCEP service, which for convenience is handled by the sample service as well. It looks a little different for IOS (http://scep-server/cgi-bin/pkiclient.exe
) and Windows SCEP servers (http://scep-server/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
).
=begin |
# scep instance NOTE: required for MS SCEP servers |
payload_content['Name'] = "" |
=end |
The service can provide different certificate issuing services parameterized on the Name
value that becomes part of the final URL. In the case of Windows, this value needs to be set, although any value will do.
payload_content['Subject'] = [ [ [ "O", "ACME Inc." ] ], |
[ [ "CN", purpose + " (" + UUIDTools::UUID.random_create().to_s + ")" ] ] ]; |
if (!challenge.empty?) |
payload_content['Challenge'] = challenge |
end |
The subject allows the client to specify the requested subject. In this case, it is populated by the profile service. Some services may not want to grant the client the ability to specify it, and may use the Challenge
to encode the identity of the requester.
X.509 subjects are elaborate structures and are mimicked here as an array of arrays, to fully specify it. Each key-value pair is specified as an array. The key is the first element and is a string with a value that is either an ID (for example, "0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25" is DC) or one of the recognized abbreviations (CN, C, ST, L, O, OU). The example above represents a subject that will often be displayed as "/O=ACME Inc./CN={purpose} ({random UUID})".
payload_content['Keysize'] = 1024 |
Next up are some, simple parameters, although they require some consideration. Key size requests the device to generate a keypair of a certain size. Only 1024-bit and 2048-bit key sizes should be used. Keys larger than 2048 bits are not supported. In general, 1024-bit keys are recommended because of the overhead involved in generating 2048-bit keys.
payload_content['Key Type'] = "RSA" |
The key type should always be RSA because this reference implementation (and in practice, SCEP) only support RSA keys.
payload_content['Key Usage'] = 5 # digital signature (1) | key encipherment (4) |
Key usage specifies the purposes the key can be used for and is a bit mask. Bit 0 (value 1) specifies digital signature, and bit 2 specifies key encipherment. Note that the MS SCEP server will only issue signature or encryption, not both.
=begin |
payload_content['CAFingerprint'] = StringIO.new(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new(@@root_cert.to_der).digest) |
=end |
SCEP can run over HTTP, as long as the CA cert is verified out of band. This functionality is currently disabled (as shown above) because iOS does not currently support this. This function supports such operation by adding the fingerprint to the SCEP payload that the phone downloads over HTTPS during enrollment, as shown below:
payload['PayloadContent'] = payload_content; |
payload |
end |
payload = client_cert_configuration_payload(req) |
# vpn_configuration_payload(req) |
相关推荐
标题“两级OTA或Cascode OTA设计”所指向的知识点主要围绕差分放大器的一种特殊设计——运算跨导放大器(Operational Transconductance Amplifier,简称OTA)及其在模拟集成电路中的应用。OTA是一种可以将输入电压...
"OTA_OTA Master_ble_ble ota_ota 升级"这个标题暗示了我们正在讨论一个专门用于BLE(Bluetooth Low Energy,蓝牙低功耗)设备的OTA升级工具或框架——OTA Master。 1. **BLE设备的无线升级烧录**: BLE设备广泛...
Android OTA(Over-The-Air)升级流程是智能手机中一种常见的无线更新机制,允许设备通过移动网络或Wi-Fi连接下载并安装新版本的系统或应用程序。这个过程不仅涉及软件更新,还涉及到确保更新的安全性和正确性。以下...
本文将深入探讨ESP32的串口Over-the-Air (OTA)更新技术,通过分析提供的"ESP32_OTA.zip"学习资料,包括"linux_ota_dome.zip"、"ESP32-UART-OTA"和"LINUX-UART"等文件,来理解如何实现ESP32的固件更新。 1. **什么是...
Android OTA代码简单分析 Android OTA(Over-The-Air)升级是Android操作系统中的一种重要功能,允许设备远程升级固件,提高了设备的安全性和可靠性。本文将对Android OTA代码进行简单分析,涵盖OTA版本编译及包...
**Android 源码与 BES OTA 升级详解** Android 源码是 Android 操作系统的基石,它包含了操作系统的核心组件、系统服务、库以及应用程序框架。对于开发者而言,理解 Android 源码能够深入探究系统的工作原理,进行...
### Google OTA机制介绍 #### 概述 在现代Android设备中,Over-the-Air (OTA) 更新机制是一项关键的技术,它允许终端用户通过无线网络接收并安装系统与应用软件的更新。这一机制不仅提升了用户体验,同时也极大地...
《OTA7290B数据手册》详细解析 OTA7290B是一款高效整合的1803通道源极驱动器,专为中尺寸彩色TFT-LCD面板设计,集成了MIPI接口与时序控制器。这款芯片在单个封装内包含了源极驱动器、时序控制器、VCOM缓冲器、伽玛...
标题中的“telink 手机ota apk”指的是泰凌微电子公司提供的用于手机Over-the-Air(OTA)更新的应用程序。OTA更新是一种无线技术,允许设备通过网络接收软件更新、固件升级或应用程序的新版本,而无需通过USB线缆或...
RT-Thread-OTA用户手册介绍了RT-Thread操作系统下的在线固件升级技术(Firmware Over-the-Air Technology, OTA),该技术允许开发者轻松实现对嵌入式设备固件的远程管理、升级和维护。手册中详细阐述了OTA技术的特点...
STM32F769_OTA_APP_stm32OTA_OTA_stm32otademo_STM32OTA升级_stm32wifi这个主题主要涉及STM32微控制器的空中更新(OTA)功能,利用WiFi连接从远程服务器下载固件升级包。STM32系列是意法半导体(STMicroelectronics...
OTA(Over-The-Air)升级是一种通过无线网络对设备固件进行更新的技术,常用于嵌入式系统,如物联网设备、智能手机和平板电脑等。在C语言环境下实现OTA升级,通常涉及以下几个关键知识点: 1. **文件下载**:OTA...
ESP32 simple_ota_example是基于ESP32微控制器的固件在线更新(Over-the-Air, OTA)示例项目,适用于Windows 10操作系统,并使用Visual Studio Code (VSCODE)作为集成开发环境,结合ESP-IDF工具链进行开发。...
STM32 OTA(Over-the-Air)应用笔记主要讲解如何在STM32微控制器上实现空中下载升级功能,这是针对基于闪存系统的常见需求,允许在产品发布后通过通信接口远程更新固件。该技术尤其适用于嵌入式硬件和单片机应用,如...
### OTA更新前提条件 1. **备份用户数据和手机设置** 在进行OTA更新前,为了防止数据丢失,建议用户先对手机进行数据备份。备份内容包括主题设置、应用设置、IE设置以及密码等。用户可以通过设置菜单进入同步我的...
### 知识点一:ESP32 OTA (Over-the-Air) 更新机制 #### 学习目的及目标 - **掌握OTA工作过程**:理解如何通过无线方式远程更新ESP32设备上的固件。 - **掌握ESP32的OTA程序设计**:学会编写和实施ESP32设备的OTA...
"Android-OTA升级流程资料" Android-OTA升级流程是Android系统提供的一种标准软件升级方式,通过空中下载技术(Over-the-Air Technology)实现设备的远程升级。整个升级流程可以分为三个阶段:生成升级包、下载...
《Tlsr8258-OTA升级工具详解》 在物联网(IoT)领域,设备的固件更新是保持其安全性和功能完善性的重要环节。Tlsr8258-OTA升级工具就是专为Tlsr8258芯片设计的一种远程固件更新解决方案。了解并熟练掌握这一工具的...
根据提供的文件信息,我们可以深入探讨MOTO OTA Provisioning的相关知识点,包括其背景、技术细节以及在实际应用中的重要性。 ### MOTO OTA Provisioning概述 MOTO OTA Provisioning(Over-the-Air Provisioning)...
物联网OTA(Over-The-Air Technology)技术是指通过无线网络远程对设备进行固件或软件的更新升级,是物联网设备维护和迭代的重要方式。由于物联网设备种类繁多、分布广泛,传统的物理更新方式已经无法满足快速迭代和...